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Abstract
To enhance the mobile ad hoc networks (MANETs) security, various trust-based security schemes have been
proposed. However, in most of the trust-based security schemes, a node’s trust is computed based on a single trust
attribute criteria, such as data forwarding. Using single trust attribute criteria may cause the bootstrapping problem,
which refers to the time required by the trust-based scheme to build trust and reputation among nodes in the
network. The bootstrapping problem in these schemes may provide more opportunities to misbehaving nodes to
drop packets and remain undetected for longer time in the network. Moreover, using single trust attribute criteria
does not effectively deal with the selective misbehavior by a smart malicious node.
In this work, we propose a scheme that is based on the multi-attribute trust criteria to minimize the bootstrapping
time, which ultimately improves the performance of the scheme in terms of high malicious node detection rate, low
false-positive rate, and packet loss rate. The contributions of this paper are (a) identification of trust attributes along
with the development of a comprehensive multi-attribute trust framework (MATF) using multiple watchdogs for
malicious node identification and isolation, (b) formal modeling and verification of our proposed MATF using HLPN,
SMT-Lib, and Z3 Solver, and (c) simulation-based validation and evaluation of the proposed trust framework in the
context of optimized link state routing (OLSR) protocol against various security threats, such as message dropping,
message modification, and link withholding attacks. The simulation results revealed that the proposed trust
framework achieves about 98% detection rate of malicious nodes with only 1–2% false positives. Moreover, the
proposed MATF has an improved packet delivery ratio as compared to the single attribute-based scheme.
Keywords: Trust, Packet loss, Bootstrapping time, Security attacks, Formal verification, High-level Petri nets
1 Introduction
Due to the non-availability of central authority and the
unreliability of wireless links, the routing protocols in
mobile ad hoc networks (MANETs) are vulnerable to vari-
ous types of security threats [1]. The resource-constrained
nature of MANETs with continuously evolving topology
and frequent network partitioning complicates the secu-
rity challenges in MANETs’ routing. Most of the secure
routing protocols for MANETs utilize some form of cryp-
tography to ensure the network security [2–4]. However,
there are scenarios, where cryptography techniques fail to
capture malicious behavior of a node. For example, (a) to
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disrupt the network topology, a node may provide falsi-
fied routing information to other nodes, (b) to preserve
the battery, a nodemay not participate in the routing func-
tions, and (c) a node may drop data packets instead of
forwarding because of the malicious intention. To address
these issues, trust-based security schemes [5–10] have
been proposed to augment the security of traditional
cryptography-based approaches.
In MANETs, trust can be defined as to what extent a
node can fulfill the expectations of other node(s) as per
the specification of an underlying communication pro-
tocol [11]. In trust-based security schemes, each node
within the network manages an independent trust table
to compute and store the trust values of other nodes. The
routing decisions are based on the computed trust values
of the nodes. Although a lot of research work has been car-
ried in the field of trust and reputation based systems in
© 2016 The Author(s). Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0
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MANETs, however, almost all the proposed schemes suf-
fer from one basic problem known as bootstrapping prob-
lem [12]. It refers to the time required by the trust-based
scheme to build trust and reputation among nodes in the
network. Such delay in accumulation of trust and reputa-
tion is often not acceptable in time-critical applications.
Due to the slow trust building process, a misbehaving
node may have more opportunities to drop packets before
being detected as malicious. One of the basic reasons for
the aforementioned bootstrapping problem is that in most
of the trust-based security schemes, an evaluated node’s
trust is computed based on a single trust attribute, such
as data forwarding [13–17]. Moreover, using single trust
attribute may not effectively deal with the problem of
selective misbehavior [12]. A smart malicious node may
misbehave in the context of one network function and
behave properly for other network functions. For example,
a node may misbehave in the context of data forward-
ing while demonstrating good behavior when dealing with
the control packet forwarding. As the existing schemes
[7–10, 13–17] use single trust attribute, the aforemen-
tioned selectivemisbehaving node is declared asmalicious
node and isolated from the routing path, hence no longer
will be available to be used for other network functions.
In trust-based security schemes, each node collects two
major types of information about other nodes: first-hand
information (based on self-observations) and second-
hand information (based on the other node observations).
In literature, efforts have been made to minimize the
bootstrapping time and to increase the detection rate by
using second-hand information to evaluate the trustwor-
thiness of the nodes [14, 17]. However, the aforemen-
tioned schemes still suffer from data sparsity problem
[14]. In trust-based security schemes, data sparsity is a
situation where lack of information or insufficient inter-
action experience makes it difficult to evaluate the node’s
trust, especially in the early time of network establish-
ment. Moreover, using second-hand information without
any filtration may cause bad-mouthing and false praise
attack [11], which ultimately cause high false positive and
false negative rate. In bad-mouthing attack, a misbehaving
node propagates dishonest and unfair recommendations
against an innocent node with a negative intention to
confuse the trust model. Similarly, in false praise attack,
a misbehaving node propagates unfairly positive recom-
mendations against the malicious node to mislead the
trust model.
It is also of critical importance to prove the correct-
ness of the trust-based security schemes in dynamic and
unpredictable environments, such as of MANETs. A well-
established approach to prove the correctness of a system’s
model is by employing a formal verification process [18].
To minimize the bootstrapping time and expedite the
trust building process, and to effectively deal with the
selective misbehavior, there is a strong need for a mech-
anism that works on multi-attribute-based trust strat-
egy. Each node should be observed in the context of all
the possible network functions, such as control message
generation, control message forwarding, and data packet
forwarding. Moreover, an efficient recommendation fil-
tration technique is required to filter the source of infor-
mation and information itself. To avoid bad-mouthing and
false praise attacks, second-hand information from only
designated and trustworthy nodes must be considered in
a trust computation process.
Our contributions: In this work, we address the boot-
strapping and delusive trust dissemination problem when
using second-hand information.We propose a trust-based
security scheme which uses multi-attribute-based trust
criteria, such as control packet generation, control packet
forwarding, and data packet forwarding. Using multi-
attribute trust criteria which minimizes the bootstrapping
time and expedite the trust building process, as nodes
are assessed in the context of different aforementioned
network functions. Moreover, to avoid bad-mouthing and
false praise attacks, second-hand information is consid-
ered from only those nodes called watchdog nodes, whose
trust values are above some threshold. Furthermore,
second-hand information from recommender nodes with
trust deviation (τdev) value1 less than the deviation thresh-
old (τdev−th) will be considered in the trust computation
process. This paper has the followingmajor contributions.
• Identification of the trust attributes for a node’s trust
building process.
• Development of a comprehensive multi-attribute and
multiple watchdog nodes trust framework (MATF)
for malicious node detection and isolation.
• Formal verification of our proposed MATF using
high-level Petri nets (HLPNs), satisfiability modulo
theories-library (SMT-Lib), and Z3 Solver.
• Implementation of the proposed trust framework in
the context of optimized link state routing (OLSR)
protocol in NS-2 [19].
• Simulation-based validation and evaluation of the
proposed MATF in comparison with the recently
proposed trust scheme by Shabut et al. [14] (single
trust-attribute-based scheme), against various
security threats, such as message dropping, message
modification, and link withholding attacks.
• Security analysis of the proposed MATF.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In
Section 2, we present the related work. Section 3 presents
the discussion on trust and its formulation in MANETs
along with a multi-attribute trust framework. Section 4
presents the formal modeling and verification of the
proposed framework. Section 5 presents the simulation
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results and summarizes the performance evaluation of the
proposedmodel. Security analysis of the proposed scheme
is presented in Section 6, and the paper is concluded in
Section 7.
2 Related work
Trust-based security schemes are one of the active
research areas for ensuring the security in MANETs [20].
In recent years, different trust-based security schemes
have been proposed to enhance the security in MANETs.
In these schemes, nodes evaluate their neighbor nodes
based on the first-hand information or using recommen-
dations from other nodes [12, 20]. Though, these schemes
paid some attention to the problem of bootstrapping and
delusive trust dissemination problem, however, an effi-
cient mechanism to mitigate the aforementioned problem
is still a challenging issue in MANETs. We categorize the
state-of-the-art schemes in the following categories.
2.1 Watchdog and path-rater schemes
One of the key works in trust-based schemes was pre-
sented by Marti et al. [13]. They proposed watchdog
and path-ratermechanisms implemented on the dynamic
source routing (DSR) protocol to minimize the impact of
malicious nodes on the throughput of the network. The
aforementioned approach detects the misbehaving nodes
by using only source node as a monitoring node. How-
ever, the proposed scheme has some major shortcomings,
such as it cannot detect the misbehaving nodes in the case
of ambiguous collision, receiver collision, limited trans-
mission power, partial dropping, and collaborative attacks
[21]. Moreover, watchdog and path-rater mechanisms uti-
lize only first-hand information for node misbehavior
detection that causes the aforementioned issues.
2.2 Feedback-based schemes
To solve the issues in the watchdog and path-rater
schemes, various approaches were proposed, such as
acknowledgment-based detection systems including two
network-layer acknowledgment-based schemes, termed
as TWOACK [22], adaptive acknowledgment (AACK)
[23], and enhanced adaptive acknowledgment (EEACK)
[21]. The TWOACK scheme has focused to solve the
receiver collision and limited transmission power prob-
lems of the watchdog and path-rater approach. Every data
packet transmitted is acknowledged by every three con-
secutive nodes along the path from the source to the
destination. Sheltami et al. [23] proposed an improved
version of the acknowledgment-based scheme, AACK.
The AACK is the intrusion detection system which is a
combination of TWOACK and end-to-end acknowledge-
ment scheme. Although, AACK has significantly reduced
the overhead as compared to TWOACK scheme, it still
suffers from the problem of detecting malicious nodes
generating false misbehavior report and forged acknowl-
edgment packets. To remove the shortcomings of the
acknowledgement-based schemes, Shakshuki et al. [21]
proposed EAACK protocol to detect misbehavior nodes
in MANETs’ environment using digital signature algo-
rithm (DSA) [24] and Rivest-Shamir-Adleman (RSA) algo-
rithm [25] digital signatures. Although, their technique
can validate and authenticate the acknowledgement pack-
ets, yet at the expense of extra resources, and it also
requires pre-distributed keys for digital signatures.
2.3 Network monitoring-based schemes
Buchegger et al. presented a cooperation of nodes-fairness
in distributed ad-hoc networks (CONFIDANT) protocol
[7] to detect misbehaving nodes in the network. In addi-
tion to first-hand information, second-hand information
is also used while computing a node’s trustworthiness. In
CONFIDANT protocol, first-hand information is propa-
gated after every 3 s, while weight given to the second-
hand information is 20%. To avoid false praise attack
[11], only negative experiences as second-hand informa-
tion are shared among nodes. One of the shortcomings
in CONFIDANT protocol is that ALARM messages used
in the protocol can be exploited by the bad-mouthing
nodes. Bad-mouthing nodes may generate ALARM mes-
sages against the legitimate nodes to induce biasness in the
protocol’s results [22]. Similarly, a collaborative reputa-
tion mechanism to enforce node cooperation in MANETs
called CORE [9] also uses the second-hand information
to compute the reputation of a node. Only positive expe-
riences are shared by the node with other nodes in the
network to avoid bad-mouthing attack.
In contrast to CONFIDANT and CORE [9],
observation-based cooperation enforcement in ad hoc
networks (OCEAN) protocol [26] uses only first-hand
observation to avoid false praising and bad-mouthing
type of attack. In OCEAN, avoid-list strategy is imple-
mented to not forward the traffic from misbehaving
nodes. However, if a node identifies that its ID is inserted
to the avoid-list, it may change its strategy. A tamper-
proof hardware is required to secure the avoid-list to
avoid the aforementioned incident.
To filter the second-hand information, [14] proposed a
defence trust scheme based on three parameters: (a) confi-
dence value, indicating how many interactions took place
between a recommender node and an evaluated node,
(b) deviations in the opinions of recommender node and
evaluating node, and (c) closeness value, indicating the
distance-wise close of recommender node and the eval-
uating node. On the basis of the aforementioned values,
an evaluating node filters the second-hand information
in the proposed trust scheme. However, the second-
hand information filtration mechanism in the proposed
scheme may not work well in some scenario. For example,
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recommender nodes R1,R2 . . .RN send the bad reputa-
tion value of misbehaving node M to evaluating node E,
while node E has a good reputation value about node M
based on its own first-hand information. In the aforemen-
tioned proposed scheme [14], such recommendations are
filtered out because of more deviation in the trust values.
In contrast, our proposed MATF scheme filters the rec-
ommendation by using the following methodology. When
recommendations received at the evaluating node from
the recommender node about some particular evaluated
node, the evaluating node averages the recommendations
already received from all the watchdog nodes (recom-
mender nodes) then, finds the trust deviation of the rec-
ommender node’s trust value from the average trust value.
If the deviation in trust values is less than certain deviation
threshold, weight is given to the recommendations in the
trust computation; otherwise, no weight is given to these
recommendations.
Li et al. [27] proposed a simple trust model which
takes into account the packet forwarding ratio as met-
ric to evaluate the trustworthiness of neighbor nodes. A
node’s trust is computed by the weighted sum of packet
forwarding ratio. To find a path trust, continued prod-
uct of node’s trust values in a routing path is computed.
The aforementioned approach only considers packet for-
warding behavior as a trust metric. A trust prediction
model based on the node’s historical behavior called trust-
based source routing (TSR) protocol was presented in
[28]. On the basis of assessment and prediction results,
the nodes can select the shortest trusted route to trans-
mit the required packets. One of the weaknesses of this
work is that no second-hand information is considered for
trust computation that may result in bootstrapping and
data sparsity problem [14]. Trust-based security schemes
like [16] only consider the security of data traffic, while
schemes like [29, 30] only consider the security of con-
trol traffic. Moreover, the aforementioned solutions result
in more energy consumption due to excessive information
propagation and detection messages. In [31], energy effi-
ciency is considered as one of the parameters and have
improved previously existing trust-based algorithms.
To summarize, the trust-based security schemes dis-
cussed in this section have some open problems that need
to be solved. Most of the existing schemes use single
trust criteria for the trust building process that causes
the bootstrapping and data sparsity problem. Minimiz-
ing the bootstrapping time and the data sparsity prob-
lem is still an open issue [12, 14]. Moreover, using all
the available information from each and every node in
the network does help in building reputation and trust
among nodes quickly, but as discussed earlier, it makes
the system vulnerable to false report attacks. To solve the
aforementioned false praise and bad-mouthing attacks,
there should be a mechanism which filters the spurious
second-hand information. Although, the aforementioned
approaches suggest the misbehavior detection schemes,
these schemes use single trust attributes like data forward-
ing. Moreover, second-hand information are considered
from recommender nodes without any filtration that can
result in erroneous trust estimation, especially under high
nodal mobility. In contrast, our proposed MATF is based
on multiple trust attributes with multiple observer nodes
that results in better trust estimation. Second-hand infor-
mation are considered from recommender nodes with
deviation values less than the deviation threshold, which
results in better trust estimation, especially under high
nodal mobility.
3 MATF: the proposed scheme
In this section, we present the trust attributes, trust for-
mulation in the proposed MATF, a mechanism for trust
deviation test, and watchdog node selection process. In
the proposed MATF, the watchdog node is the desig-
nated neighbor node of the evaluating node tomonitor the
activities of the evaluated node B on the basis of defined
trust attributes and is represented byW. It can be the eval-
uating node itself or any other node that has been assigned
the monitoring task by the evaluating node. The evaluat-
ing node computes the final trust of the evaluated node
based on its own observations and those reported by the
watchdog nodes. Our proposed trust model consists of
three steps. The first step is the monitoring step, in which
an evaluating node S and watchdog nodesWn observe the
behavior of an evaluated node B in the context of trust
attributes ρ. For clarity, in the following equations, we
treat an evaluating node as one of the watchdog nodes.
In the second step, an evaluating node aggregates its own
observations and the watchdog nodes’ observations in the
context of each trust attribute. Finally, an evaluating node
computes the final trust of an evaluated node in the con-
text of all the trust attributes using the weighted sum.
Also, the value range of ρ is [0, 1], 0 being the minimum
and 1 the maximum.
3.1 Trust attributes
Trust attributes are the factors responsible for shaping the
trust levels and denoted by ρ. Each trust attribute value
ranges between 0 and 1. Before going into the details as
how we applied trust in MANETs, first, we discuss the
basic trust attributes and then, define our trust model.
We have identified the following trust attributes in the
context of control and data traffic for the proposed trust
model.
3.1.1 Control packet generation (ρcpg)
Control packet is the protocol-specific information that
nodes exchange to build routes and maintain topology.
By using this trust attribute, an evaluating node assesses
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the trustworthiness of the evaluated node in the context
of control packet generation behavior as specified in the
underlying routing protocol. Observations of a node W
about node B in terms of control packet generation is
given in the following equation:




where t is the current time,  is the trust update period,
p is the total actual number of control messages generated
in the time interval (t, t + ) by node B as observed byW,
and pexp is the expected number of control messages that
should have been generated by node B.
An evaluating node then aggregates its observations
and the observations reported by the watchdog nodes to
build a reputation about node B as shown in the following
equation:









where α is the weight factor given to an evaluating node
observation and watchdog node observations.
3.1.2 Control packet forwarding (ρcpf)
Nodes in a MANET depend on mutual cooperation to
forward traffic. A non-cooperative forwarding node may
drop packet or forward control packet with delay that can
result in the inconsistent view of the network topology.
Let us denote the packets that are successfully overheard
as pack. The observations of a node W regarding node B




cpf (t, t + ) = 1 −
p − pack
p . (3)
According to the above equation, the minimum possi-
ble packet loss rate observed at an evaluating/watchdog
nodeW is 0, while the maximum possible packet loss rate
is equal to 1, i.e., all the sent packets are dropped by mis-
behaving nodes. An evaluating node then aggregates its
own observations and that of watchdog nodes to obtain an
aggregated reputation of node B in terms of control packet
forwarding as follows:











where α is the weight factor given to an evaluating
node observations and watchdog node observations in the
above equation.
3.1.3 Data packet forwarding (ρdpf)
In addition of control traffic, nodes are also responsible of
relaying data packets. A node may drop the data packet
and forward data packets with delay or with maliciously
modified contents. The observations of node W regard-
ing node B in terms of data packet forwarding can be
computed using the following equation:
ρ
W ,B




where ξ is the total number of data packet sent and pack is
the data packet successfully overheard at watchdog node
W. Aggregating evaluating node’s and watchdog node’s
observations, we get the aggregated reputation of an eval-
uated node in the context of data packet forwarding as
given in the following equation:











Algorithm 1 The MATF trust computation algorithm
1: procedure MONITORING( )
2: ρW ,Bcpg (t, t + ) = ppexp
3: ρW ,Bcpf (t, t + ) = 1 − p−packp














ρcpg , ρcpf , ρdpf
)
7: end procedure
8: procedure TRUST_COMPUTATION(ρcpg , ρcpf , ρdpf )











3.2 Trust formulation and algorithm
We are now able to combine the equations introduced so
far into our mathematical model for the multi-attribute
trust computation. By combining Eqs. 2, 4 and 6, we
obtain
τBS (t, t + ) =
δρcpg + βρcpf + γρdpf
δ + β + γ , (7)
where δ,β , and γ are weight factors assigned to each met-
ric and δ + β + γ = 3. The weights can be tuned based
on the specific security goal to be achieved. For example,
if a higher throughput and packet delivery is concerned,
we consider the data traffic as vital, so data forwarding
parameter carry more weight than other parameters, such
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as control packet generation and forwarding. An evaluat-
ing node S aggregates the trust computed for evaluated
node B during the time interval (t, t + ) in the context of
each trust attribute ρ and assigns weights to each afore-
mentioned attributes in the above equation. The trust
computed in Eq. (7) is compared with a threshold value to
make a decision regarding trustworthiness of a node.
Algorithm 1 presents the pseudo code for the MATF.
In the proposed algorithm, an evaluating node and des-
ignated watchdog nodes observe the evaluated node in
terms of different network functions during the monitor-
ing period (lines 1–4). A filtration criteria is applied on the
recommendations received from watchdog nodes (line 5).
Based on the filtered recommendations, an evaluating
node computes the trust of an evaluated node (lines 8–10).
If the trust of an evaluated node is lower than a thresh-
old (lines 12–13), it is isolated from the routing path and
a new route selection process is initiated (Line 14).
3.3 Trust deviation
The trust computed by the watchdog nodes will be used
as a second-hand information in the proposed scheme. To
avoid bad-mouthing and false praise attacks, only those
information will be used by the evaluating node which is
received from the designated nodes and have a trust devi-
ation value less than the deviation threshold. Trust devia-











∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ τdev−th, (8)
where τ(Wi,j) is the average trust already received from the
watchdog nodeWi about the evaluated node j and τ(Wk ,j) is
the trust recommendation received from watchdog node
Wk about the evaluated node j.
3.4 Watchdog selection process
In order to avoid the bad-mouthing and false praise
attacks, the second-hand information in the proposed
MATF is considered from only designated and trustwor-
thy watchdog nodes, as discussed in the previous sub-
section. In this section, we discuss the selection process
of the watchdog nodes, which will perform the monitor-
ing task. When the network is initialized, each evaluating
node selects a set of neighboring nodes called watchdog
set to monitor the behavior of a particular evaluated node.
The proposed security scheme allows flexibility in the
watchdog selection. Depending on the available network
topology, one or multiple watchdogs may be selected.
There is no fixed ratio per node of watchdog nodes to be
selected. It will be varying depending on the available net-
work topology. It is worth mentioning that in case of any
change in network topology, an evaluating node will re-
compute the watchdog nodes. The criteria and selection
Algorithm 2 Relay and watchdog node selection
Description: For a node S, the 1-hop neighbor set N1(S)
and the 2-hop neighbor set N2(S) are known. N∗1(S) and
N∗2(S) are the unprocessed 1-hop and 2-hop neighbor
sets of node S, respectively. Malicious set(S) is the set of
malicious nodes maintained at node S.
Input: N1(S) and N2(S).
Output: The sets relay(S) and watchdog(S).
1: watchdog(S) ←− ∅
2: relay(S) ←− ∅
3: Malicious set(S) ←− ∅
4: for each node do τinitial ←− 1
5: end for
6: procedure RELAY_COMPUTATION( )
7: for each isolated node y ∈ N∗2(S) do
8: if (node x ∈ N∗1(S) ∧ node x /∈
Malicious set(S) ∧ node x is the only neighbor of
node y) then
9: relay(S) ←− node x




13: while N∗1(S) = ∅ do
14: if (node x ∈ N∗1(S) ∧ node x /∈ Malicious set(S)∧ node x reaches the maximum number of nodes in
N∗2(S)) then relay(S)←− node x;






20: procedure WATCHDOG_COMPUTATION( )
21: while relay(S) = ∅ do
22: for each node x ∈ relay(S) do
23: watchdog(S) = N∗1(S) ∩ N1(x) ∧ (τnb > η) // com-
mon neighbors of evaluating node S and relay node x,





process of watchdog nodes are presented in Algorithm 2,
which is a modified version of the relay node selection
algorithm presented in [32]. An example scenario of the
detailed working of the watchdog selection algorithm is
presented below.
In the given scenario, node S discovers its neighbors
through exchange of control messages and calculates the
one-hop neighbor set N1 and the two-hop neighbor set
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N2 (used as an input in Algorithm 2). From the set N1,
each evaluating node S computes the relay node set R(S)
(lines 6–18) and the watchdog set W (S), having a trust
value greater than the trust threshold (lines 20–26). R(S)
is the smallest possible subset of N1(S) required to reach
all nodes in N2(S).
As an example, in Fig. 1, R(S) = {B,C,E} contains the
minimum number of one-hop neighbors of S required
to reach all two-hop neighbors of S. Thereafter, node S
selects the watchdog set for each node present in R(S) =
{B,C,E}. To calculate the watchdog set for each node in
the R(S), the node S takes the intersection of the one-hop
neighbor set N1(S) and the one-hop neighbor set of each
relay node.
Node S broadcasts the W (S) to the neighboring nodes
by appending it in the periodic control messages along
with R(S). This enables the neighboring nodes of S to
check whether or not they have been selected as a watch-
dog. By utilizing the broadcast information sent by the
node S, each node builds the watchdog selector set. The
watchdog selector set consists of all those nodes that
have selected node W as a watchdog. For example, as
reflected in Fig. 1, node S populates theW (S){A,H} for the
relay node C by taking the intersection of sets N1(S) =
{A,B,C,D,E,H} and N1(C) = {A, S,H ,X}. Thereafter,
node S broadcasts the watchdog set to inform both nodes
A and H that from now onward, these nodes have to
monitor node C.
4 Formal modeling and verification of theMATF
Formal verification is the process verifying that algo-
rithms work correctly with respect to some formal prop-
erty [33]. Formally modeling systems helps to analyze the
interconnection of components and processes and how
the information is processed in the system [34]. Formal
modeling provides valuable tools to design, evaluate, and
Fig. 1 An example working scenario of the MATF
verify such protocols [35]. To verify the correctness of the
MATF, we use HLPNs for the modeling and analysis [18].
HLPNs provide a mathematical representation and help
to analyze the behavior and structural properties of the
system.
To perform a formal verification of the MATF, the
HLPNmodels are first translated into SMT-Lib [36] using
the Z3 Solver [37]. Then, the correctness properties were
identified and verified to observe the expected behavior of
the models.
In this section, we present a brief overview of HLPNs
and a formal verification of the MATF.
4.1 High-level Petri nets
Petri nets are used to model systems which are non-
deterministic, distributed, and parallel in nature. HLPNs
are a variation of conventional Petri nets. A HLPN
is a structure comprised of a seven-tuple, N =
(P,T , F ,ϕ,R, L,M0). The meaning of each variable is pro-
vided in Table 1.
4.2 SMT-Lib and Z3 Solver
SMT is an area of automated deduction for checking the
satisfiability of formulas over some theories of interest
and has the roots from Boolean satisfiability solvers (SAT)
[34]. The SMT-Lib is an international initiative that pro-
vides a standard benchmarking platform that works on
common input/output framework. In this work, we used
Z3, a high-performance theorem solver and satisfiability
checker developed by Microsoft Research [38].
4.3 Modeling and verification of the MATF
To model and verify the design of the MATF, the places
P and the associated types need to be specified. The data
type refers to a non-empty set of data items associated
with a P. The data types used in the HLPN model of the
MATF are described in Table 2. Figure 2a present the
HLPN model for the relay and watchdog node selection
Table 1 Variables and meaning
Variables Meanings
P A finite set of nodes, called Places
T Set of transitions, that is, P ∩ T = ∅
F A set of directed edges called arcs, known as the
flow relation, that is, F ⊆ (P × T) ∪ (T × P)
ϕ A mapping function used to map P to data types
R A transition rule mapping T to predicate logic
formula, that is, R : T → Formula
L A label mapping F to labels, that is, L : F →
Label
M0 An initial marking of places with tokens, that is,
M : P → Tokens
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Table 2 Data types and their descriptions
Types Description Types Description
sn_id Source node ID Status Message status
msg Message Trust values Trust observations
wd_id Watchdog node ID Trust_threshold Trust-threshold
relay_id Relay node ID Msg-type Message type
relay-msg Message sent by Timer TC packet timer
relay node
in the MATF. Moreover, message forwarding, trust com-
putation, and malicious node isolation are depicted in the
HLPN model shown in Fig. 2b. As depicted in Fig. 2a,
there are six places in relay and watchdog selection
HPLN, whereas seven places in the HLPN model for trust
computation, as shown in Fig. 2b. The names of places and
description are given in Table 3. The next step is to define
the set of rules, pre-conditions, and post-conditions to
map to T. The mapping of transition T to the processes
used in the MATF, referred to as rules (R). After defin-
ing the notations, we can now define formulas (pre- and
post-conditions) to map on transitions in the following.
The set of transitions T = { Gen-Nlist, Gen-WDN, Gen-
relay, Broadcast, Forward, Trust-obs, Comp-Mali}. The
following are the rules used for modeling and verification.
The rule R1 depicts the HELLO message process-
ing. When the network is initialized, nodes exchange
the HELLO messages with each other to discover the
neighbors in the network. The HELLO message contains
the list of one-hop neighbors of a node. On the basis of
Fig. 2 HLPN of the MATF (a, b)
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Table 3 Places and mappings of data types to the places
Places Mappings
ϕ(Hello Pkt) P(sn_id × msg-type ×1-HNL × timer)
ϕ(Nodes) P(sn_id ×nb_id × timer)
ϕ(1-HNL) P(sn_id × nb_id × nb_id × status × timer)
ϕ(2-HNL) P(sn_id × msg × nb_id × nb2hop_id ×timer)
ϕ(Source Node) P(sn_id × msg × wd_id × relay_id × msg-type ×
relay-msg × timer)
ϕ(WD-Nodes) P(sn_id × msg × wd_id × relay_id × msg-type ×
relay-msg × timer)
ϕ(relay-nodes) P(sn_id × msg × wd_id × relay_id × msg-type ×
timer × status)
ϕ(Network) P(sn_id×msg × relay_id× msg-type)
ϕ (SN-Obs) P(trust-value-fwd × trust-value-gen × trust-value-
mod × relay_id)
ϕ (NAdmin) P(Trust-threshold)
ϕ(Malicious) P (relay_id × trust-val)
received HELLO messages, a node compute the one-hop
and one-hop neighbors.
R(Gen-Nlist) = ∀hp ∈ HP,∀gn ∈ G − Node | ∀1hl ∈ 1HL
|1hl[ 2] := GenNeighbour (hp, gn[ 1] ) ∧ 1HL′ = 1HL∪{(
gn[ 1] , 1hl[ 2]
)} ∧ ∀2hl ∈ 2HL|2hl[ 2] := Gen − 2HN
(hp, gn[ 1] ) ∧ 2HL′ = 2HL ∪ {(gn[ 1] , 2hl[ 2] )}
(R1)
After populating one-hop and two-hop list, watch-
dog nodes and relay nodes are selected for monitoring
and packet relaying purpose, respectively, as depicted in
Algorithm 1. In rule R2, using the one-hop list, watch-
dog nodes are selected. The nodes that are not relay nodes
and in the one-hop list of the relay node and source node
are selected as watchdog. Also, the set of relay nodes
are selected from one-hop neighbor list to reach two-
hop neighbors. The transition Gen-WDN and Gen-relay
is mapped to the following rules R2 and R3, respectively.
R(Gen-WDN) =∀g1 ∈ G − 1HL,∀ mpl ∈G − MPL,∀wdl
∈ WDL,∀gn ∈ Gn|gn[ 1] /∈ mpl −→ wdl[ 1] := mpl[ 1]∧
wdl [2] := mpl [2] ∧ wdl[ 3] := gn[ 1]∧WDL′ = WDL∪
{(wdl[ 1] ,wdl[ 2] ,wdl[ 3] )}
(R2)
R(Gen-relay) = ∀ g1 ∈ G − 1HL,∀g2 ∈ G − 2HL,∀gn ∈
GN ,∀mpl ∈ relay − L| [Con (g1[ 1]i:g1[1], gn[ 1] , g2[ 1] ) >
Con
(
g1[ 1]j:g1[1]∧j =i, gn[ 1] g2[ 1]
) ∨ Con − iso (g1[ 1] , gn
[ 1] , g2[ 1]
) = True] −→ mpl[1] := gn[ 1]∧mpl[ 2] := g1
[ 1]∧relay − L′ = relay − L ∪ {(mpl[ 1] ,mpl[ 2] )}
(R3)
So far, the watchdog and the relay nodes are selected.
Now, the source node generates a message and wants to
broadcast it into the network. In rule R4, the same process
is depicted, where the source node generates the message
and in response the watchdog nodes overhear it and the
respective relay node receives it.
R(Broadcast) = ∀m ∈ Msg,∀oh − sn ∈ OH − SN ,∀ rm ∈
Rec − SN |oh − sn[ 1] := m[ 1]∧oh − sn[ 2] := m[ 2]∧oh−
sn[ 4] := m[ 4]∧oh − sn[ 5] := m[ 5]∧OH − SN ′ = OH−
SN ∪ {(oh − sn[ 1] , oh − sn[ 2] , oh − sn[ 3] , oh − sn[ 4] ,
oh − sn[ 5] , oh − sn[ 6] , oh − sn[ 7] )} ∧ rm[ 1] := m[ 1]∧
rm[ 2] := m[ 2]∧rm[ 4] := m[ 4]∧rm[ 5] := m[ 5]∧Rec−
SN ′ = Rec − SN ∪ (rm[ 1] , rm[ 2] , rm[ 3] , rm[ 4] , rm[ 5] ,
rm[ 6] , rm[ 7] , rm[ 8] )}
(R4)
The relay node forwards the message that it received
from the source node. When the relay node forwards
the message, the watchdog nodes and the source node
overhear the message forwarded by the relay node. The
same is depicted in rule R5. We compute the trust of the
relay nodes by (a) computing the number of messages
forwarded by the relay nodes by analyzing the overheard
messages of source node and watchdog nodes, (b) check-
ing the contents of the message forwarded by the relay
node, and (c) by investigating if the relay node generate its
own control messages. The computations are performed
the same way as explained in Algorithm 1.
R(Forward) = ∀ohm ∈ OH − relay∀rem ∈ Get − Msg,∀f
∈ Flood,∀ohsn ∈ OH − SNMP | rem[ 2] = NULL ∧ rem
[ 8]= Send () −→ (f [ 1] := rem[ 1]∧f [ 2] := rem[ 2]∧f [ 3]
:= rem[ 4]∧f [ 4] := rem[ 5]∧Flood = Flood ∪ (f [ 1] , f [ 2] ,
f [ 3] , f [ 4] ) ∧ (ohm[ 1] := rem[ 1]∧ohm[ 2] := rem[ 2]∧
ohm[3] := rem[3]∧ohm[ 4] := rem[ 4]∧ohm[ 5] := rem[ 5]
∧ ohm[ 6] := rem[ 6]∧ohm[ 7] := rem[ 7]∧OH − relay′ =
OH − relay ∪ (ohm[1] , ohm[2] , ohm[ 3] , ohm[4] , ohm[5] ,
ohm[ 6] , ohm[7] )ohsn[6] := rem[ 2]∧OH − SNMP = OH
− SNMP∪{(ohsn[ 1] , ohsn[ 2] , ohsn[ 3] , ohsn[ 4] , ohsn[ 5] ,
ohsn[ 6] , ohsn[ 7] )})
(R5)
In rule R6, the source node computes the trust of relay
node based on its own observations and those received
from watchdog nodes according to Eq. 7. In rule R7, trust
computed in rule R6 is compared to the trust threshold
and if certain node trust falls below threshold, the node
will be isolated from the routing path.
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R(Trust-Obs) = ∀gsno ∈ Get − SNO,∀gwdo ∈ Get−
WDO,∀t ∈ Trust | gsno[4]= gwdo[4]∧gsno[2]= gwdo[2]
−→ t[ 1] (gsno[6] ) ∪ (gwdo[ 6] )gsno[ 2]α ∧ Content(gsno
[ 2] , gsno[ 6] ) = Content(gwdo[2] , gwdo[6] ) −→ t[ 2]β∧
gsno[ 5]= TC ∧ gwdo[ 5]= TC ∧ Gen − TC − Pack(gwdo
[ 4] , gsno[ 4] ) > gsno[ 7]−→ t[ 3] γ ∧ t[ 4] , gsno[ 4]∧T ′ =
T ∪ {(t[ 1] , t[ 2] , t[ 3] , t[ 4] )}
(R6)
R(Comp-Mali) = ∀ gto ∈ Get − T ,∀gth ∈ Get − Th∀
cm ∈ Comp − Mali | Sum(gto[ 1] , vgto[ 2] , gto[ 3] ) < gth
−→cm[1] := gto[4]∧cm[2] := Sum(gto[1] , gto[2] , gto[3] )
CM′ = CM ∪ (cm[ 1] , cm[ 2] )
(R7)
4.4 Verification of properties
In our analysis, we aim at verification of the following
correctness properties.
Property 1: common neighbors of source node S and
relay node x having a trust greater than the
trust threshold must be selected as
watchdog nodes.
Property 2: second-hand information must be
considered from only those nodes which are
designated as watchdog nodes.
Property 3: second-hand information is considered
from only those nodes having a trust value
greater than the trust threshold and whose
trust deviation is less than the deviation
threshold.
Property 4: A trust of a malicious node M misbehaving
in the context of one of the trust attribute
must be decremented as per the
specification of MATF.
4.5 Verification results
To perform the verification of the HLPN models using
Z3, we unroll the model M and the formula f (proper-
ties) that provides Mk and fk , respectively. Moreover, the
said formulas are then passed to Z3 to check if Mk |= fk
(if the formula f holds in the model M up to the bound
k execution time). The solver performs the verification
and provide the results as satisfiable (sat) or unsatisfiable
(unsat). If the answer is sat, then the solver will gener-
ate a counter example, which depicts the violation of the
property or formula f. Moreover, if the answer is unsat,
then formula or the property f holds in M up to the
bound k (in our case k is exec. time). In these verification
results, we verify the properties mentioned previously.
It is worth mentioning here that in our formal verifica-
tion results, we verify the correctness properties of the
proposed scheme, not the performance of the proposed
scheme (for performance evaluation results, please refer
to the Section 5).
Due to high time-consuming process, execution time is
an important metric to verify the properties of the MATF.
Figure 3 depicts the time taken by the Z3 Solver to prove
that the properties discussed previously in Subsection 4.4
hold in the model.
5 Experimental performance analysis
In this section, we evaluate the performance of MATF in
comparison to the scheme proposed in [14], referred to
as single attribute-based trust framework (SATF) in what
follows. Network simulator 2 (NS-2)[19, 39] is used to
implement and analyze the performance of the proposed
MATF. For the simulation experiments, we have varied
the mobility speed of the nodes between 1 and 10m/s.
For data traffic, 30 % of the total nodes in the network
are selected as source-destination pairs (sessions), spread
randomly over the network. Only 512-byte data packets
are sent. The packet sending rates in each pair are varied
to change the offered load in the network. All traffic ses-
sions are established at random times near the beginning
of the simulation run and stay active until the end. More-
over, a very popular and commonly used mobility model,
called random way point mobility model [40], is used
for node mobility. In the aforementioned mobility model,
each node selects a random destination and starts mov-
ing with a randomly chosen speed (uniformly distributed
between 0 and a predefined maximum speed).
The trust threshold value is 0.4 in this set of experiments
[14], which is the maximum tolerated misbehavior for a
node to be a part of the network [41]. A trust threshold
Correctness property






















Fig. 3 Verification time taken by the Z3 Solver
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value determines the trust level that a node has to main-
tain to be a legitimate node. To handle high-dimensional
parameter space, we define some commonly used simu-
lation parameters, as stated in Table 4. The number of
simulation experiments has been chosen sufficiently large
in order to get 95 % confidence interval for the results.
5.1 Experimental adversarial model
In our adversarial model, the malicious node count is set
to 10–30 % of the total nodes in the network. In order
to evaluate the proposed scheme against the adversary
nodes thoroughly, malicious nodes are selected randomly
to keep their distribution uniform in the network. In our
experiments, we simulated packet dropping attack by hav-
ing malicious nodes dropping control and data packets
randomly or selectively with 25 % probability. Moreover,
malicious nodes are also misbehaving by launching the
withholding attack against the legitimate nodes. In with-
holding attack, misbehaving node does not generate con-
trol traffic as per the specification of the routing protocol.
Because of the aforementioned behavior of misbehaving
nodes, legitimate nodes are unable to have a consistent
and updated view of the network. Furthermore, number
of malicious nodes exercise bad-mouthing and false praise
attacks in collusion is varied from 10 to 50 % of the total
nodes in the simulation scenarios.
5.2 Simulation results and analysis
We now discuss the results of the comparison between
the MATF and the SATF in terms of several performance
metrics.
5.2.1 Impact of trust deviation threshold
Trust deviation threshold means that second-hand infor-
mation whose deviation from an evaluating node’s obser-
vations is greater than the aforementioned threshold will
be filtered out while computing the evaluated node trust-
worthiness. To select the best optimal trust deviation
Table 4 Simulation parameters
Simulation time 1000 s
Number of nodes 60
Number of malicious nodes 10–30%
Network size 1000 × 1000m
Transmission range 250m
Max speed 1–10m/s
Mobility model Random way point
Traffic type Constant bit rate (CBR)
Trust threshold 0.4
Deviation threshold 0.4
Energy model Generic energy model [44]
threshold to filter second-hand information, we simu-
late the MATF for varying the deviation threshold with
increasing number of dishonest nodes. For this set of sim-
ulation, the mobility speed is set to 1–4m/s. Dishonest
nodes exercise the false praise and bad-mouthing attacks
to show the impact on detection rate and false positives
rate, respectively (Fig. 4).
Figure 5a, b illustrates the impact of increasing number
of dishonest nodes on the false positive rate and detection
rate under different trust deviation thresholds. It can be
inferred from Fig. 5a that detection rate is first increasing
up to the deviation threshold of 0.4 and then decreasing
with increasing number of dishonest nodes. The reason
is that with higher trust deviation threshold, false recom-
mendations from bad-mouthing nodes are not filtered out
during the trust computation of evaluated nodes, which
provides more opportunities to misbehaving nodes to
remain undetected.
Similarly, Fig. 5b shows the impact of varying trust devi-
ation threshold for increasing number of dishonest nodes.
It is obvious from the figure that with increasing trust
deviation threshold, the false positives rate is also increas-
ing. The reason is that with higher deviation threshold,
such as 0.5 and 0.6, false recommendation from bad-
mouthing nodes having deviation of 60 % are only filtered
out which causes legitimate nodes as misbehaving nodes,
hence more false positives rate.
It can be summarized from the above results that 0.4 is
an optimal trust deviation threshold in terms of detection
rate and false positives. It is worth mentioning here that
we will use the trust deviation threshold of 0.4 for the rest
of the simulation scenarios.
5.2.2 Trust values
Figure 4 shows the trust values computation of a some
specific misbehaving node at different simulation time





















Fig. 4 Trust value computation vs. simulation time




















































Fig. 5 Impact of trust deviation threshold on detection rate and false positive rate (a, b)
the trust in an expedite way of the misbehaving node to
achieve the threshold because of multi-attribute and effi-
cient dishonest recommendation filtration criteria, hence
more informed decisions. The MATF evaluates the eval-
uated node on the basis of different network functions,
hence more informed and prompt decisions about the
trustworthiness of nodes can be taken. However, in case of
the SATF, the trust is computed slowly due to high boot-
strapping time and data sparsity problem. The reason for
this behavior is that evaluated nodes are observed in the
context of data forwarding only. It can be inferred from
Fig. 4 that the MATF efficiently overcomes the bootstrap-
ping and data sparsity at the start-up of the network as
compared to SATF.
5.2.3 Detection time and detection rate
Detection time refers to the time taken by the trust-based
security scheme to detect and declare a misbehaving node
as a malicious node. Similarly, malicious node detection
rate is calculated as the percentage of malicious nodes
detected among the total number of malicious nodes
within the network.
Figure 6a shows the malicious node detection time for
increasing node speed in the MATF and the SATF. Afore-
mentioned figure shows that the time required in case
of the MATF for increasing node speed is smaller as
compared to the SATF. The detection time required for
misbehaving node detection in the SATF is almost double
the MATF. The reason for this behavior is the slow trust
building process as discussed in the Fig. 4 analysis. Over-
all, the detection time is increasing for increasing node
speed. This is because of the fact that for higher node
speed, nodes have smaller time of interaction; hence, it
takes time to build the trust under the high node mobility.
Figure 6b shows the detection rate for increasing node
speed. As shown in figure, detection rate is higher in case
of the MATF. The reason is that in the MATF, the node’s
trust is analyzed in multiple contexts, which expedite the
detection rate. Similarly, Fig. 6c shows the malicious node
detection rate with the simulation time. The figure shows
that the percentage of the malicious node detection is
higher in case of the MATF as compared to the SATF. The
detection rate is 100 % at time t = 500 s in the MATF,
while half of the malicious nodes are detected in the case
of the SATF.
Figure 6d illustrates the impact of increasing the num-
ber of nodes on the detection rate while keeping the
mobility fixed at 1–6m/s. It can be inferred from the
figure that there is a slight increase in the detection rate
with increasing node density. This is due to the fact that
under high node density, higher number of watchdogs will
be available to observe the behavior of an evaluated node
that leads to better detection rate.
The impact of colluding dishonest attackers on detec-
tion rate is shown in Fig. 6e. As the figure shows, MATF
scheme is able to keep the detection rate nearly about 90 %
even in case of higher number of false praise nodes as
compared to SATF. The reason is the implementation of
an efficient trust deviation criteria, hence more confidant
decisions. Due to efficient trust deviation criteria, recom-
mendations from colluding dishonest attackers are filtered
out and are not considered in the trust computation of an
evaluated node.
5.2.4 False positive rate
The false positive rate is the ratio of the legitimate nodes
declared as malicious to the total number of legitimate
nodes.
Effect of node speed on false positive rate is shown in
Fig. 7a, under the MATF and the SATF. Figure 7a illus-
trates that false positive rate is much lower in theMATF as
compared to the SATF. The reason for the aforementioned
behavior is that MATF uses the second-hand informa-
tion from only designated nodes which have a deviation
in trust values less than the deviation threshold, hence
more informed decisions about the node’s trustworthi-
ness. While in case of the SATF, second-hand information
are used from all the neighbor nodes to compute the trust-
worthiness of a node. As there are some nodes deployed in
the network, exercising the bad-mouthing attack against
the legitimate nodes causes higher false positives rate in
the SATF. Overall, the figure shows that with an increase



















































































































Fig. 6 Effect on detection rate (a–e)
in the node speed, the false positives rate also increases.
The aforementioned behavior is due to the fact that an
evaluating node and the watchdog nodes cannot differ-
entiate between intentional and unintentional malicious
activities of a node. For example, even if a node fails to
forward a packet because of the network conditions, it is
regarded as a malicious activity by a node. As a result,
under high node speed, the false positives rate increases.
Similarly, Fig. 7b shows the effect of increasing node
density on false positive rate. The figure illustrates that
for increasing node density, the false positive rate in case
of the MATF is lower as compared to the SATF. The
reason is that more legitimate nodes are selected as watch-
dog, which provides accurate and precise information
about the trustworthiness of the evaluated nodes and also
because of using an efficient filtration criteria to filter the
dishonest recommendations. In case of the SATF, the false
positive rate is increasing as the number of bad-mouthing
and false praising nodes are also increasing, which causes
a false trust estimation about the legitimate nodes.
Figure 7c shows the impact of dishonest colluding
attackers on false positive rate. It is obvious from the
figure that MATF withstands effectively against the
increasing dishonest nodes in terms of false positives. The
reason is the use of an efficient trust deviation criteria
in the proposed scheme as previously discussed in the
reasoning of Fig. 6e.
5.2.5 Packet delivery ratio
Packet delivery ratio (PDR) is the ratio of the number of
data packets generated by a source node and the num-
ber of packets received at the destination. With malicious































































Fig. 7 Effect on false positives (a–c)
node count set to 20 % of the total number of deployed
nodes, the control and data packet dropping and with-
holding attacks are implemented. Figure 8a illustrates the
effect of the mobility speed of the nodes on the PDR
while keeping the data rate constant at 4 kbps. Figure 8a
shows that the MATF has higher PDR as compared to the
SATF as it isolates malicious nodes from the routing paths
very earlier (as shown in Fig. 6c). Moreover, it can also
be observed that the PDR decreases with increasing node
speed. The reason for the aforementioned behavior is that
at a higher node speed, the node drops packets due to
the frequent link changes. These results illustrate that the
MATF eliminates the malicious nodes well in time from
the network and improves the PDR by 10–12 % for varying
mobility speeds of the nodes.
5.2.6 Packet loss rate
In this section, we present the packet loss analysis of the
proposed MATF. Although the packet delivery ratio pro-
vides the big picture of efficiency and effectiveness of any
scheme, however, the reason to present the packet loss
analysis in this paper is to show the effectiveness of the
MATF scheme in terms of reducing the packet loss due to







































Fig. 8 Effect on PDR and packet loss rate (a, b)
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loss in MANETs, such as packet loss due to link errors,
queue overflow, frequent link changes, and malicious
drop [42, 43]. In these simulation results, we consider
the packet loss that is only caused by the malicious
node-dropping packets. Figure 8b shows the packet loss
rate for the increasing node speed in the MATF and the
SATF. The results show that the MATF has about 8–15 %
less packet loss rate as compared to the SATF. The reason
for this behavior is that misbehaving nodes are detected
and isolated well in time on the basis of multi-attribute
trust criteria. However, in case of the SATF, the misbe-
having nodes are detected and isolated very late in the
simulation (as shown in Fig. 6c), which provides more
packet drop opportunities to the misbehaving nodes.
5.2.7 Energy consumption
The major causes of the energy consumption in MANETs
are the packet transmission and reception. To compute
the energy consumed by the nodes in both the MATF
and SATF schemes, we use the generic energy model sup-
ported by NS-2. The generic energy model can estimate
the consumption of energy for continuous and variable
transmission power levels. The parameters we used are
as follows: 100 J of initial energy, 0.05W for transmis-
sion, 0.02W for reception, 0.01W for idling, and 0.0W
when sleeping. It is worth mentioning that energy con-
sumed is shown in percentage in these results, which is
the total percentage energy consumption of the initial
energy of a node. The energy consumption of the pro-
posed MATF in comparison to the SATF is shown in
Fig. 9a. As there is no extra message communication in the
MATF in comparison to the SATF, the figure shows that
energy consumption is almost equal to that of the SATF.
A slight increase in the energy consumption in case of
MATF is because of the nodes in MATF requiring some
extra processing to compute the trust of the nodes on the
basis ofmulti-attribute trust criteria.Moreover, the packet
delivery ratio is higher and packet loss due to malicious
nodes is lower in the MATF in comparison to the SATF,
which also causes more energy consumption as packets
need to travel more longer paths in the network, hence
more energy consumption at those nodes in the routing
path.
5.2.8 Normalized routing load
Normalized routing load (NRL) is the ratio of the total
number of control packets transmitted by the nodes to
the total number of received data packets at the destina-
tion nodes. It is used to evaluate the efficiency of a routing
protocol.
Figure 9b illustrates that NRL is smaller in the MATF
as compared to the SATF. The reason is the more packet
delivery ratio per control packets in the MATF. As the
SATF suffers frommore packet loss as shown in the figure,
control packets sent per data packet is higher, which
causes higher NRL in the SATF. Overall, the routing over-
head is increasing in both the schemes with an increase
in the node speed. The reason for this behavior is that
to maintain the routes under high node mobility, more
control packets are transmitted.
6 Security analysis
In this section, we present the security analysis of the
proposed MATF against the various attacks.
6.1 Security against bad-mouthing and false praise attack
In the MATF, second-hand information is considered
from only those nodes, which are designated as watchdog
nodes, having trust value greater than the trust threshold,
and trust deviation is less than the deviation thresh-
old. Due to the aforementioned criteria for second-hand
information, the MATF effectively withstands against the
bad-mouthing and false praise attacks.
6.2 Security against selective misbehavior
A smart adversary node may misbehave selectively, such
as drops data packets, while forwards control pack-








































Fig. 9 Effect on energy consumption and NRL (a, b)
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privilege provided by the MATF, an evaluating node can
selectively use smart misbehaving nodes to perform dif-
ferent network functions. For example, if an adversary
node misbehaves by dropping data packets only, then an
evaluating node can use such a node for other network
functions, such as control packet forwarding.
6.3 Security against colluding attackers
In the proposed scheme, an evaluating node uses the
trust attributes based on local states and its own obser-
vation; collusion attack is not much effective against
the scheme. The only collusion attack that is possible
against the scheme is the publication of false-praise and
bad-mouthing information against the legitimate nodes.
In the proposed MATF, efficient trust deviation cri-
teria are used which filter such false-praise and bad-
mouthing information, as discussed in Figs. 6e and 7c.
Results presented in the aforementioned figures reveal
that the proposed MATF scheme efficiently withstands
against the colluding attackers up to 30 % of the total
nodes.
7 Conclusion and future work
In this work, we proposed a scheme that is based on
the multi-attribute trust criteria to minimize the boot-
strapping time and to deal with the selective misbehav-
ior. The proposed trust model augments the security of
a MANET by enabling a node to identify and remove
malicious nodes from the routing paths by overhear-
ing transmission at multiple nodes (evaluating node and
watchdog nodes). The proposed security scheme not only
provides a way to detect attacks and malicious behav-
ior accurately and timely but also reduces the number of
false positives by using the concept of multi-watchdogs.
The proposed trust model is evaluated in the context
of OLSR routing protocol. Moreover, to prove the cor-
rectness of the proposed scheme, we also presented a
formal verification of our proposed MATF using HLPN,
SMT-Lib, and Z3 Solver. Comparison between the MATF
and the SATF has shown that our proposed scheme
has more efficiently detected malicious nodes. More-
over, the MATF has shown promising results under
high mobility speed of the nodes and frequent topology
changes.
Simulation results show that the proposed trust model
achieves 98–100 % detection rate of malicious nodes with
only 1–2 % false positives. The proposed MATF has an
improved packet delivery ratio in comparison to the SATF
of about 90–75 and 80–65%, respectively, in a network
with malicious nodes.
We plan to extend our work by using the adaptive
mechanism for the weight assignment to different trust
attributes based on the run-time network conditions.
Moreover, we will evaluate our proposed scheme as an
extension to some other reactive routing protocol like
DSR to analyze the effect of underlying routing protocol.
Endnote
1The difference between the trust values of a recom-
mender node and an evaluating node about a particular
evaluated node.
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